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24 October 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR: Project Director
SUBJECT : Review of Requirements

1. The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee, in considering new specific requirements proposals which are discussed below, has reaffirmed that it believes it to be of utmost importance that every effort be made to obtain political permission for broad authority to pursue the requirements set forth in our recommendations of 9 October 1957, 25X1

2. The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee calls attention to the probable vital intelligence which may be secured by recoverage of TYURA TAM proximate to the date of 7 November, a date which we are led to believe may bring forth both important events and announcements from the Russians bearing upon further advances in space satellite development and missile development. In urging that TYURA TAM be recovered, the time element is the controlling factor inasmuch as it is the view of the Committee that among requirements presented in our most recent summary of highest priority requirements those pertaining to the long range bomber question present our most critical problem. This is true because of the need for us

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
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
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to equate in our National estimates the relative effort of the USSR being expended in the guided missile and the long range bomber fields.



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3. The specific justification for a recovery of TYURA TAM at this time and a breakdown of what we may expect to see and its significance are attached at Tab A.

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5. The Ad Hoc Requirements Committee has considered the recommendations of the Navy for the coverage of MOLOTOVSK earlier recommended in connection with SEVEROMORSK (which was covered by AQUATONE)




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
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 Note was also taken of the fact that there remains up until the early days of November a light angle of 10° or more. Therefore, coverage of MOLOTOVSK if to be accomplished in this season must be handled promptly. The Army, Air Force, and Office of Scientific Intelligence, while recognizing that the element of timeliness in terms of operational feasibility do not consider the MOLOTOVSK coverage in the same level of importance to the National interest as reconvergence of TYURA TAM, again within about the same time period.

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#. With regard to the long range bomber question, we wish to point out that coverage of the five key bases recommended would require more than one mission as well as deeper penetration, which would prove the layman's assumption that greater risk is entailed than either a TYURA TAM mission or a MOLOTOVSK mission. We are concerned, however, that current efforts to produce a National Intelligence estimate on the long range bomber question will be faced with extreme difficulty if no new hard evidence is provided on which to base such estimates and the importance of that estimate with regard to vital National decisions is apparent.